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August 2007 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent applications of economic geography models to tax competition have modiﬁed the neo-
classical race-to-the-bottom result. In case of full agglomeration, capital might earn a premium
that can be taxed by local authorities without any distortions. This agglomeration rent makes
the mobile factor quasi-inelastic for a certain range of trade costs so that tax rates on capital
income might rise in line with deepened market integration. This argument has been made
by Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind et al. (2000) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). Borck
and Pﬂüger (2006) show that this result also holds in a framework with partial agglomeration
equilibria.
It is reasonable to consider tax competition in a new economic geography framework as
economic activity is certainly not evenly spread across space in reality. This might provide a
sound argument for why we should not observe a downward trend in tax burdens on corporate
income. However, stylised facts seem to underline the neoclassical tax competition result with
eﬀective average tax rates on corporate income having fallen over the recent 25 years. This
paper provides an explanation for why there might still be a race to the bottom despite the
existence of agglomeration rents.
We extend the basic new economic geography setup by considering two symmetric regions
that consist of two jurisdictions (countries) each. This leads to a situation in which a single
jurisdiction within the agglomerated region cannot skim oﬀ the rents of the mobile factor as
long as tax policies are not coordinated. Such a scenario is pretty likely for many real world
phenomena. Baldwin and Krugman (2004), for instance, view Belgium, the Netherlands, Lux-
embourg, Germany, France and the UK as the European core whereas the surrounding countries
can be referred to as the periphery. Another example would be the agglomerated eastern border
region of Canada and the US. Here, marginal tax diﬀerences might cause ﬁrm movements since
alternative locations within this core oﬀer to serve the same market at the same cost. This inter-
pretation can be extended to a more disaggregated level, for example, tax competition between
municipalities or counties.
The next section provides some stylised facts about recent trends in corporate income taxa-
tion. Section 3 introduces the economic geography model and lays out its features without tax
competition. In section 4, we discuss optimal tax policy in the absence of capital mobility to de-
rive a benchmark case. We continue to analyse the tax game before we discuss the implications
of tax harmonisation. Section 5 concludes.
22S t y l i s e d f a c t s
A ﬁrst look at statutory tax rates on corporate income unambiguously reveals a downward trend
over recent decades.1 However, corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP stayed rather constant
in most OECD countries or even went up in some cases. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) interpret
this share as a measure for the average corporate tax rate and take it as evidence that there
is no race to the bottom. But the trend in corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP
might be a misleading measure of tax competition if the share of corporate proﬁts in GDP has
changed over time. Indeed, Sorensen (2007) provides some evidence that corporations became
more dominant as an organisational form so that the share of corporate proﬁts in GDP went
up in recent years. Hence, this simpliﬁed measure cannot capture the true tax burden. It is
more reliable to directly look at eﬀective average tax rates on corporate income.2 As Figure 1
demonstrates, the eﬀective average tax rates show a clear downward trend in the tax burden.
In 2003, only Ireland and Canada imposed a higher eﬀective average tax rate relative to 1982.
Figure 1: Eﬀective average tax rates on corporate income (IFS, 2007)
1According to data from the Institute for Fiscal Studies at www.ifs.org.uk.
2Devereux et al. (2002) argue that the eﬀective average tax rate is the relevant reference for discrete investment
decisions.
3With economic activity being unevenly spread across space we should address the puzzle
why rents from agglomeration do not seem to be taxed away in reality. It is this paper’s task to
provide an answer to this question.
3M o d e l
We employ an analytically tractable variant of the Krugman (1991) core-periphery model due
to Forslid (1999) — also referred to as the footloose entrepreneur model. We extend the frame-
work to four symmetric countries being located in two regions, North and South. Each region
accomodates two countries 1 and 2 and we denote Southern countries by an asterisk. Symmetry
refers to endowments, tastes and technology. However, trade costs are asymmetric in the sense
that they might take any value between regions, but they are zero within. All countries are
endowed with capital (K) and labour (L) producing two goods, a homogeneous traditional good
(Y ) and an industrial composite good à la Dixit-Stiglitz (X).
Preferences. Consumer preferences can be summarised by a two-tier utility function. The
upper tier is Cobb-Douglas whereas preferences for the composite industrial good can be de-













CXi and CYidenote aggregate demand for the composite and the traditional good, respectively.
The income share households dedicate to manufacturing goods is μ, nw characterises the mass
(number) of varieties in all countries and σ>1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties. The demand for a manufactured variety in country i is denoted by cmi
including both domestic and foreign supply.
Utility maximisation yields demand functions for the two aggregates as well as for each
variety
























μEi for Southern varieties,
4where Pi is the price of the composite industrial good, pY the price for the Walrasian commodity
and Ei expenditure in country i. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms charge identical mill prices pm.W e
adopt the common assumption that only cross-border transactions of X are impeded by iceberg
trade costs. Accordingly, ﬁrms have to ship τ units of any variety for one unit to arrive at
its ﬁnal destination. Hence, consumer prices for foreign and domestic manufactured varieties
diﬀer by the magnitude of the iceberg trade cost τ.W ec h o o s eY as numéraire and restrict our
analysis to conﬁgurations in which the traditional good is produced in each country. With zero
trade costs in Y it follows that pY =1everywhere.
Technology. Production of the traditional good requires one unit of labour per unit of
output. With zero trade costs for Y , intersectoral mobility of workers, and pY =1 ,i tf o l l o w s
that wages are equated to unity across borders. Firms in the monopolistic competition sector
require both capital and labour for production. Capital is only needed to set up a ﬁrm and
workers constitute the variable input. In order to produce x units of any variety, the ﬁrm faces
costs of r + aXx,w h e r er is the cost of capital and aX denotes the unit labour requirement.
This generates increasing returns to scale implying that any single variety is only produced by





The proﬁt function for any ﬁrm in the industrial sector is
πm =( p − aX)Xm − r = Xm/σ − r,
where Xm represents total demand for any variety produced in country i. Free entry of ﬁrms
ensures that pure proﬁts are driven down to zero in equilibrium.
Short-run equilibrium. Employing the zero proﬁt conditions jointly with optimal demand
allows us to calculate the return to capital as





































where φ ≡ τ1−σ is a measure of the freeness of trade with φ ∈ [0,1].W h e nφ =0trade costs
are prohibitively high and there are no barriers when φ =1 .N o t et h a tc a p i t a lo w n e r se a r nt h e
same reward within a region, no matter in which country they reside. The reason is that trade
5costs are zero within regions so that we can regard countries within a region as one common
market. The ns denote the number of ﬁrms that operate in the respective countries.
Long-run agglomeration pattern. Capital moves to the country that oﬀers the highest
utility — that is the highest real reward net of taxes. Although symmetry ensures that capital
returns are identical in all countries in autarky, the footloose entrepreneur model features ag-
glomeration forces that dominate the dispersion force if trade costs are suﬃciently low. Thereby,
initial symmetry might collapse so that full agglomeration of the mobile factor accrues in one
location. We can illustrate two of the forces at work with the help of (3). First of all, a higher
l e v e lo fe x p e n d i t u r ei no n ec o u n t r yi n ﬂuences capital returns positively (at a given n). This is
referred to as the market access eﬀect favouring agglomeration. The counterforce — the market
crowding eﬀect —i sr e ﬂected in the denominator. A higher number of ﬁrms ceteris paribus
decreases capital returns as ﬁrms compete more severely for the relatively scarce labour force.
Finally, as capital owners care about real rewards, the price index eﬀect always works in favour
of agglomeration as well. Living in the larger market implies that fewer varieties have to be
imported which saves transport costs.3
Full agglomeration of capital generates speciﬁc rents for the mobile factor. This so-called
agglomeration rent measures the capital return diﬀerential between the return in the agglomer-
ated region and the return capital would earn if it would be relocated to the periphery. This
literally locks in the mobile factor for suﬃciently low levels of φ as it does not pay oﬀ to move















where sn denotes the share of ﬁrms operating in the Northern region.5 The agglomeration rent
ΩC is bell-shaped in φ.I fφ exceeds a threshold φS (sustain point), full agglomeration renders
a stable equilibrium and ΩC exceeds unity (less than unity otherwise). If trade is unrestricted
(φ =1 ) , location does not matter and ΩC =1 . In the remainder of the paper, we focus on full
agglomeration of manufacturing in the Northern region.
3See Baldwin et al. (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Forslid (1999) for a more detailed discussion of
these eﬀects.
4We implicitly assume here that ﬁrms behave in an uncoordinated manner. Of course, a simultaneous move
of all ﬁrms to the periphery ensures the same agglomeration rent and thus the same real income.
5See Baldwin and Krugman (2004).
64T a x a t i o n
4.1 Autarky
We assume that the government can set the capital income tax independent of the labour
income tax and exclude the latter from our analysis. Tax rates are weakly positive, i.e. we do
not allow for capital subsidies. Gross tax revenue is then given by G = trK. We assume that
the social welfare maximising government cares about tax revenue and the consumption of its
citizens. Furthermore, given any size of government and consumption level the authority prefers
lower taxes to higher taxes. Formally, we have W = W(G,C,t),w i t hWG > 0, WC > 0 and
W( ¯ G, ¯ C,t) >W ( ¯ G, ¯ C,t0) if t<t 0. To ease notation we write W(G,C). Consumption equals
total income, C =( 1−t)rK+L. The government welfare function W is assumed to be concave
in t such that there is a maximum for some t ∈ (0,1) in the absence of relocation concerns.6
The properties of our government welfare function, especially concavity in t, are akin to those in
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and Pﬂüger (2006). The optimal tax rate in autarky







Result 1. In autarky core countries set their capital income tax to some strictly positive ta.
4.2 Tax competition
We follow Baldwin and Krugman (2004) in modelling the tax-setting behaviour as a two-stage
game of complete but imperfect information. Whil et h ec o r ea n dt h ep e r i p h e r ys e tt h e i rt a x e s
sequentially with the core moving ﬁrst, both tax authorities within one region set their taxes
simultaneously.7 Table 1 summarises the timing.
Stage 1: Northern countries set their taxes t1, t2
Stage 2: Southern countries set their taxes t∗
1, t∗
2
Stage 3: Firms choose their location
Table 1: Timing
6Formally, this requires WG(0,rK+ wL) − WC(0,rK+ wL) > 0, WG(rK,wL) − WC(rK,wL) < 0, WGG < 0
and WCC < 0.
7Our government welfare function allows us to solve the simultaneous Nash game as well. We discuss the
diﬀerences between the simultaneous and the sequential game in more detail later in this section.
7This structure and all actions in the past are common knowledge. At stage 3 we assume that
capital can costlessly relocate to maximise its after-tax return. If after-tax returns are equal
within the core and the core remains in the North we assume that the initial distribution of
capital persists, i.e. K1/Kw = γ, 0 <γ<1. If after-tax returns are equal across regions we
assume that the core stays in the North.8 Lastly, if the South becomes the new core and after-tax
returns are equal in that region, we assume that K∗
1/Kw = γ∗, 0 <γ ∗ < 1. These assumptions
on the distribution of capital in case of identical after-tax capital returns are without loss of
generality since any distribution with positive capital in both countries is included.9
We solve the game by backwards induction. At stage 2 the Southern countries set their
tax rates. We can distinguish between two scenarios: First, if the lowest tax rate in the North
t = min{t1,t 2} does not exceed some te the core will remain in the North. To see this we
deﬁne the excess capital return an individual Northern ﬁrm faces (relative to being employed in
the South) with given taxation. To facilitate notation we drop subindices when discussing tax
competition across regions. The unindexed variables t and t∗ can be thought of as the respective
regional minima. The condition for the core to remain in the North is then
1 − t
1 − t∗ΩC > 1.
The agglomeration rent ΩC reﬂects the advantage of producing in the core rather than in the
periphery as deﬁned in (4). Capital taxation in the two regions amends this trade-oﬀ.T h e
(defense-) tax te deﬁnes the maximum tax rate the North can set without fearing to loose the
core to the South, if Southern taxes were set most aggressively, i.e. to zero. Thus, te =1− 1
ΩC.
If the core remains in the North, the Southern economies have no tax base for capital taxation.
Consequently, they set a tax t∗
i =0whenever the minimum tax charged in the North is less then
te.
Second, we have to analyse how the Southern countries set their tax rates if there is the
option of stealing the core? Note that both countries will be unambiguously better oﬀ if they





i) with g ∈ {γ∗,1 − γ∗} holds
for all t∗
i ≥ 0. Hence, attracting the core is even desirable if it requires to set the capital tax
to zero. This is indeed the case, since any marginal undercutting of the other Southern tax
authority’s positive tax rate would pay oﬀ.F o rs m a l l  we have
W ((t∗








8These assumptions could be motivated by inﬁnitesimal relocation costs.
9We abstract from γ =1since this implies that the core resides in only one country in the North. The variable
γ
∗ only describes oﬀ-equilibrium actions.






tj −   if t∗
j > 0 ,w i t h  arbitrarily small
0 if t∗
j =0 .
From these ﬁndings we can conclude that — irrespective of the tax rates in the North — both
Southern tax authorities will set their capital tax to zero in equilibrium.
The analysis for the Northern countries at stage 1 of the game is very similar. Since any
economy is better oﬀ with some manufacturing, the Northern tax authorities will not set a tax
that enables the South to steal the core. And because any marginal decrement against the other
country’s positive tax rate allows to improve welfare by attracting the full core rather than part
of it, the equilibrium tax rates in the North are equal to zero as well. Thus, we can establish
our Result 2.
Result 2. Tax competition leads all countries to set their taxes to zero. Government welfare is
lower than under autarky.
The equilibrium described here would prevail under simultaneous tax setting of all four
countries as well. This hinges on the fact that in contrast to Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
capital and income are taxed independently. Therefore, the optimal capital tax rate in an
economy without capital is zero. Intuitively, this makes the threat of stealing the core credible
even in a simultaneous game.
4.3 Tax harmonisation
The zero-tax result established in the previous subsection pushes focus on the scope for tax har-
monisation. There are several two-party coalitions one could think of. But it is straightforward to
see that some coalitions cannot achieve anything. First, there is no scope for tax-harmonisation
within the periphery. If taxes in the core remain zero, the periphery cannot attract the core,
and nothing can be gained by coordinating tax setting.
Second, cross-regional cooperation is not useful either. This would imply that one of the
core countries were to set a positive tax. But we know that this enables the other tax authority
in the North to attract the full core. While this form of cooperation is merely useless for the
periphery country it actually harms the involved Northern country.
9The only promising coalition is one among the Northern countries. Let us assume that the
Northern tax authorities both set their tax to some positive th.10 We know from the analysis
above that any tax th >t e would allow the South to steal the core and that this would decrease
Northern welfare levels below those under tax competition. If tax rates are equal, the initial
allocation of capital persists so that we can judge welfare in the Northern countries jointly.
Consequently, the maximisation of joint government welfare boils down to
max
th W(thrKw,(1 − th)rKw + L) (6)
s.t. 0 <t h ≤ te.
Recalling the deﬁnition in equation (5), we know that the optimal tax set in the North under
tax harmonisation is min{ta,t e}. Furthermore, W(thrKw,(1 − th)rKw + L) >W(0,rKw + L)
so that government welfare with harmonised taxes is higher than under tax competition.
Result 3. Under tax harmonisation Northern governments set their tax rates to th =
min{ta,t e}. Government welfare in the North is higher under tax harmonisation than under
tax competition.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented a model that explains the co-existence of agglomeration rents and a race to
the bottom in capital tax rates. These two aspects have not yet been brought together in the
tax competition literature. The reason for this result is that several tax authorities might reside
in the agglomerated area and engage in harmful intra-regional tax competition.
We believe that this constellation — several jurisdictions competing for capital within one
cluster of economic activity — is a reasonable picture of reality. On an aggregated level, countries
in the centre of the European Union have an incentive to strategically set their tax rates lower
than their neighbours in order to attract more of the manufacturing base. The same reasoning
translates to the more disaggregated level of municipalities and counties if they can set capital
taxes independently.
Allowing for intra-regional tax competition in a new economic geography framework brings
us back to the neoclassical world where governments can improve their welfare by harmonising
tax rates on mobile factors.
10Tax authorities always have an incentive to coordinate their tax rates since any discrepancy between tax rates
would result in one country losing its share of the core which would reduce welfare.
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